



How to Save TTIP

By Jörg Wolf, Jillian Beytin, Christopher Huppertz, and Matthew Skinner

INTRODUCTION

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is the most ambitious project of transatlantic cooperation today. Considering that trade between the United States and European Union comprises nearly half of world trade, consequences of any potential trade agreement between these two economic areas would have far-reaching consequences. Therefore dynamic, thoughtful discussion and critical analysis is a clear necessity.

TTIP has become an increasingly polarizing topic, with proponents extolling the potential for economic gains, job creation, and solidification of transatlantic ties while critics decry the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism as undemocratic, warn of dangers to food safety and environmental standards, and argue against taking economic promises at face value. Despite the increase in attention that is given to the potential agreement, there is a dearth of specific information concerning potential impacts on regulation and the economies. Consequently, the public discussion about TTIP has been highly influenced by assumptions, expectations, and mistrust.

Three theme weeks on atlantic-community.org have clarified certain aspects of the debate by bringing in expert analysis from all sides to present information, and settle disputes. This report presents the editorial team's conclusions and policy recommendations resulting from the project.

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. There is a Need for Greater Transparency


- **Lack of transparency increases public skepticism and creates the risk that negotiations conclude with a limited agreement or one that will not be ratified.**
- **The lack of concrete information results in a less productive public debate, as it makes space for unexamined expectations, assumptions, and misconceptions.**
- **Decision makers should clarify the reasons that some level of secrecy in negotiations is necessary.**

1.1 Transparency is a Prerequisite for Public Acceptance

ACTA, a plurilateral treaty on copyright negotiated between the US, EU, Japan, and seven other countries between 2006 and 2010, was rejected by all but Japan because transparency in the negotiations came too late. This fact was pointed out by [Sean Flynn](#), with the American University College of Law, who wrote that the proceedings had already been "marred by the (accurate) public perception that the treaty was setting new international legal rules restricting domestic intellectual property laws through an unprecedentedly secret process," and hundreds of thousands of European citizens had marched against it.

Proponents are eager to point out the level of transparency in TTIP negotiations is higher than that of previous treaty negotiations. However, there is a clear dissatisfaction with the amount and quality of information being released. Recently, the European Union published the [negotiation mandate](#), as requested by many transparency advocates. It may be too little too late, however, since a large number of people already [view TTIP with suspicion](#).

[Dr. Holger Janusch](#) from the Center for Transformative Research and Sustainability points out that "the EU Commission is concerned that opening the negotiation process at an international level could increase the complexity of the TTIP negotiations and could make it impossible to find an agreement." More public involvement in the negotiation process will potentially "tie the hands of negotiators and reduce the latitude to negotiate."



Despite the lack of flexibility that openness causes, Dr. Janusch argues that increased transparency is positive not only for the "democratic principles and the probability of a later ratification but also for the self-image of the EU". In its current state, TTIP's lack of transparency will deter citizens from looking at it with anything but skepticism. Thus, negotiators should take a first step towards mitigating this by opening the door for involvement of national parliaments and stakeholders, and by defending the level of secrecy that is maintained using practical terms that the wider public can understand.

Similarly, [Barbara Unmüßig and Bärbel Höhn](#) addressed the lack of civil society engagement and participation in the negotiations. The president of the Böll Foundation and the member of parliament consider the TTIP Advisory Board and the public consultations on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) as insufficient and criticize the EU Commission's rejection of the proposed European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) against TTIP and CETA.

1.2 Secrecy Opens the Door for Low Quality Arguments

Secrecy in negotiations means that debaters have to work on scraps of information to build their arguments. This means that, in many cases, bad arguments that are based on expectations, assumptions, and prejudice go unchecked, because there is no concrete, official information that can be used to contradict them. This aspect of the debate in the theme weeks is echoed throughout the conclusions that we draw, because of its impact on and centrality to the debate. It can be seen most heavily in the debate about food safety, where available official information is too vague to address critics' concerns.

The resulting situation is problematic as it creates an environment in which frightening claims are made and not refuted about transatlantic partners, which damages the relationship. Moreover, it allows for the focus of the debate to drift away from the big picture, and instead narrow in on arguments about very specific aspects of the treaty, which still might not be final.

2. Reform or Remove the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Mechanism

- **Currently, the debate lacks common acknowledgement of facts about ISDS.**
- **Critics should acknowledge that proponents are not arguing for an unexamined reproduction of previous implementations of ISDS.**
- **Negotiators should be active in showing that they are aware of the concerns and outlining specifically how they are being handled in the negotiations.**
- **Positive aspects of ISDS need to be more clearly laid out or ISDS needs to be excluded from the treaty.**

2.1 The Need for the Full Picture

The discussion about ISDS would greatly benefit from proponents and critics engaging in a way that acknowledges the full reality of the situation. Critics often cite cases that are undecided and involve extraordinarily large damage claims. Two of the most commonly cited cases are Philip Morris' suit against Australia, in which they claim that labelling laws expropriate their intellectual property by rendering their well-known brand less effective, and Vattenfall v. Germany, in which Vattenfall claims that recent German legislation concerning nuclear power amounts to an indirect expropriation of the nuclear plants that the company currently owns in Germany. Despite the attraction these cases might present in winning skeptical minds, they give critics a way to sweep aside criticism by responding to the individual cases, rather than the underlying concerns, since neither case has been decided, and both fall on the extreme high end of claims (both claims are higher than the highest ISDS award on record, \$1.77 billion).

[Oliver Wieck](#) with the International Chamber of Commerce Germany pointed out that the majority of actual awards amount to less than \$10 million. Furthermore, the relationship between damages claimed and damages awarded can be elaborated by looking, for example, at one of the cases that came up in the comments of [Alex Walford's](#) op-ed during our first theme week. In Cargill v. Poland, Cargill claimed damages in excess of \$150 million, but they were awarded only \$16.3 million. Two cases involving Canada under NAFTA [resulted in awards](#) of \$5 and \$1 million on claims of \$20 and \$500 million in damages respectively. Yet, this is not to say the final compensation is the only important number either. It is also important to know the

kinds of damages that companies claim, because this is part of the risk that governments must consider when facing arbitration. Such exorbitant damage claims can constitute a threat serious enough to cause governments to shelve publically supported regulations, if there is a risk of arbitration.

Finally, both sides need to acknowledge the cost of responding to, or bringing an ISDS case. As [Hendrike Kuehl](#) with the Trans-Atlantic Business Council pointed out, ISDS cases are also expensive for companies who decide to use the mechanism. In fact, the OECD has [reported](#) (p. 18) the average cost of arbitration at \$8 million. These costs mean that companies have to think hard about making a claim, and they also place a financial burden on governments that need to defend themselves. In Germany, organizations representing small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), a group often purported to be the main potential benefactors of TTIP, [already attack](#) the proposal as they cannot afford to initiate ISDS claims, giving larger corporations a clear advantage.

2.2 Critics and Proponents Agree that Past Implementations of the Mechanism have been Problematic


The disagreement between critics and proponents was not whether or not there are flaws, but whether or not they can be and are worth remedying. Two problems that were discussed were the lack of transparency in arbitrations and the fact that suits can be detrimental towards governments' ability to preserve the public good.

As was mentioned by Oliver Wieck, outcomes of ISDS arbitration are only released if both parties agree to do so, which makes the mechanism less transparent than corresponding domestic ones. He also points out, however, that unpublished outcomes are as much the result of states not wanting to look bad for foreign investment as it is the result of companies' desire for it to remain secret. The same is also true for the origins of ISDS, which originally was designed as a way for countries to attract FDI.

Alternatively, it has been noted by both sides that there is not only a lack of transparency about particular details, which are presumably what proponents defend keeping secret, but also about procedural details. Critics and proponents should agree that inclusion of ISDS would be made more positive by making the procedures involved in ISDS more transparent. This was noted by [Bill Krist](#) of the Wilson Center and [Hendrike Kuehl](#), both of whom argued in defense of ISDS.

Critics are also concerned that ISDS limits governments' abilities to react to new challenges in order to protect the public good. [Matthew Myers](#) with the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids very convincingly chronicled the tobacco industry's history of aggressively using ISDS to thwart or delay the regulatory efforts of governments. [Markus Henn](#) with Weltwirtschaft Ökologie und Entwicklung also made the case that ISDS puts governments at a disadvantage when trying to avoid financial crises, insofar as governments in several countries have already been sued as a result of using some common crisis mitigation tools, such as debt haircuts and currency devaluations.

Proponents acknowledge that there have been abuses, but also insist that abuses and problems can be fixed. Popular discomfort around the inclusion of ISDS might be reduced if negotiators would make clear that they are taking specific note of and adapting to industries that are particularly aggressive or have an especially high potential to harm the public good. This point is even more prominent if it is considered that most ISDS cases occur in industry sectors that feature frequent government intervention, such as energy. As was noted by Bill Krist, there are currently trade agreements that can serve as examples in order to make TTIP's implementation of ISDS friendlier to regulation that protects public welfare, for instance, the Australian-Korean free trade agreement, which explicitly shields governmental actions that protect health, safety and the environment from being challenged as expropriation.



2.3 Positive Aspects of ISDS

Since it was agreed that previous implementations of ISDS have been problematic, proponents also need to be clear about where the value of ISDS lies within the context of TTIP. Arguments made during our theme week in favor of ISDS have largely been based on its history and an assumption that it provides necessary protection for foreign companies that are discriminated against. Both arguments have been met with skepticism. The former because it requires dismissing troubling cases as outliers, and the latter because there is widespread trust in the judicial systems already present in the US and major EU countries like Germany, where there is the perception that companies do not need ISDS in order to invest. Proponents could make this case more convincing by showing that, while Germany does not need ISDS to be an attractive environment for investment, less developed EU countries, like Romania or Bulgaria could benefit from the investment protection provided by ISDS. It is also in Germany's interest (but missing from the debate) that its eastern neighbors receive more US investments in order to grow their economies and keep the US invested literally and figuratively.

Another argument about the value of ISDS relies on the idea that TTIP should serve as a model for others. If ISDS is not included here, its inclusion in future agreements, for instance with China, will not be possible. However, proponents need to elaborate on this point as it is not indisputable given the speculative nature of including ISDS in TTIP for the benefit of possible future treaties that might or might not happen. Additionally, given the context of countries around the world increasingly showing skepticism towards the mechanism, there is no guarantee that others will accept ISDS even if it is part of TTIP.

Given the obstacle to agreement that is presented by including ISDS in TTIP, proponents of the treaty need to either make a more convincing case for the value of the mechanism itself or allow for ISDS to be removed from TTIP. Unless the public believes that ISDS is, to a certain degree, a valuable asset, and that its implementation is done with public interests in mind, no amount of progress on this matter will be positively received.

3. Economic Growth is Modest

- **Proponents need to lay out clearly defined goals and primary benefits.**
- **Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade need to be considered in terms of social effects as well as economic ones.**
- **Proponents need to be more faithful and humble in their interpretations of technical studies, while highlighting political externalities.**

3.1 Giving Economics an Appropriate Role in the Argument for TTIP

Similar to other areas of the proposed free trade agreement, the economic benefits suffer from an overall lack of clearly defined goals: is TTIP primarily designed as an economic stimulus for still struggling economies? Or is it meant to reinvigorate a transatlantic alliance by redirecting trade flows and increasing investment (and thus

also commitments) between historic allies that will enable them to cope with the challenges of the 21st century? While many might point to the fact that it should in fact do both things at the same time, how these goals are presented has implications for the public perception of TTIP.

Presenting TTIP as an engine for economic growth through “harmonization” of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), while simultaneously pledging to safeguard a wide variety of sensitive regulation involves competing forces. And the overall lack of transparency increases suspicion among the general public, since there is no binding, specific information about which NTBs will be harmonized and which will be safeguarded. If officials then frame modest growth forecasts from economists as huge gains, mistrust and criticism not only mounts, but also spills over to other areas of the debate by creating doubts about whether other benefits are also being exaggerated.

Thus, if the goals of TTIP are not primarily to create considerable economic growth, then they need to be more clearly set out. If TTIP is presented as an engine for growth and jobs, then critics assume that standards and regulations will be lowered as they believe that this is needed to create any significant economic gains, given that the low hanging fruits of trade liberalization have already been picked. The goal of setting global standards and reinvigorating the transatlantic partnership, paired with a minor stimulus that is free of charge in terms of public money, creates the overall impression that it is less about dumping NTBs such as food regulation and more of “harmonizing” regulation where possible. It could also create what [President Komorowski of Poland termed](#) an “economic NATO”. More energy security, increased investment and trade, and a commitment to globally defend the “rules of the road” could bind the EU and US further together.

In fact this kind of modest presentation is also in tune with the Centre for Economic Policy Research [study](#), which was commissioned by the EU Commission in order to simulate the effects of TTIP. This study’s most ambitious scenario only assumes that a quarter of NTB related costs are eliminated and made projections of modest growth on the order of an increase of GDP by around 0.5% after fully implemented.

3.2 Eliminating Non-Tariff Barriers has Secondary Costs and Benefits

While eliminating NTBs can in many cases have positive results in terms of avoiding redundancy and unnecessary costs, and opening up potential markets for small and medium-sized enterprises, it can also lead to non-economic costs and benefits. This aspect of the discussion must begin with clarification of what NTBs actually are. [Dr. Martin Myant](#) with the European Trade Union Institute gave three useful examples from the automotive industry:

1. different tastes in cars
2. special taxes on high-consumption vehicles
3. different crash tests

Using the second example, a point made by both [Fabian Bohnenberger](#) of the Global Public Policy Institute and Dr. Myant can be illustrated quite well. Special taxes on cars that get low gas mileage can be seen as an expression of the will of a nation to reduce aggregate gas consumption by making certain behaviors more expensive. Therefore, eliminating this barrier could benefit manufacturers and consumers of a particular good, but it introduces a social cost by disallowing a country the use of an avenue for reducing its greenhouse gases.

Proponents view regulatory cooperation in a more optimistic light. Rather than seeing cooperation as taking regulation out of the hands of those subjected to it, [Dr. Valbona Zeneli](#) of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and [Dr. Kent Hughes](#) of the Wilson Center argued that TTIP is an opportunity for the West to take control of regulation around the globe by utilizing the sheer size of the American and European markets as incentives to get other regulators to comply with standards that reflect Western regulatory principles. This position depends on the idea that coherent

"Western" regulatory principles exist, which is called into question by critics claiming that the guiding principles underlying the US and EU regulatory regimes are fundamentally different.

3.3 Estimating the Effects of Eliminating NTBs is Very Difficult


Examining the first and third examples helps to demonstrate Dr. Myant's argument that macroeconomic projections based on NTBs are highly uncertain. As is shown by the example of different tastes, there are some NTBs that simply cannot be eliminated by treaty negotiations. Meanwhile, the third shows that some divergent regulations can create inefficiencies by requiring the redesigning of a "large number of parts without there being any functional difference", as Dr. Hughes wrote. However quantifying the costs and benefits is difficult.

This argument finds support from the Bertelsmann Foundation commissioned [IFO Institute study](#) that was discussed by Dr. Myant and which states: "Even when it is possible to clearly distinguish non-tariff barriers from tariff barriers, it remains unclear which components of the non-tariff barriers can in fact be influenced by free-trade agreements." The study avoids this difficulty by assuming that the trade creation effects from TTIP will be similar to the effects created by past free trade agreements, despite the already very high level of integration that already exists in this particular case. By contrast, the CEPR study, which was also referenced by Dr. Myant, uses data collected through expert surveys in order to estimate the costs of NTBs, and estimate scenarios assuming that different percentages of NTB related costs are eliminated.

3.4 Conveying Projections is Difficult, but Critically Important

One of the most discussed arguments was put forward by Dr. Myant, who made the case that proponents were exaggerating the results of macroeconomic projections in two specific instances. The ensuing debate on the issue highlighted the necessity of maintaining the modest character of economic projections, or risk political fallout.

In the first instance, Dr. Myant pointed out that the European Council misleadingly [cited](#) the CEPR study. The study projects how the economy might look in a year in the future with and without TTIP. Since the model is limited to the examination of a particular year, it cannot make any claim about annual growth. However, the European Council has made statements like, "every year an average European household would gain an extra EUR 545 and our economy would be boosted by 0.5% to up to 1% of GDP, or EUR 119 billion annually, once fully implemented."



Dr. Myant wrote that such statements give the impression that TTIP will boost the economy each year (as shown by the blue dotted line in the figure above), whereas the results do not show continual growth. This was confirmed in an interesting discussion that took place in the comments on atlantic-community by David Henig,

who works with the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, and [Dr. Benedikt Heid](#), who is a researcher at the University of Bayreuth. This difference in interpretation is shown in the figure below. Myant argues that the European Council is implying what is shown by the blue dotted line, whereas it was agreed by all three commenters that reasonable extrapolation of the results would mean the solid blue line.

The second instance involves the effects on the employment market, which are projected very differently in two IFO Institute [papers](#) that were published in 2014, one of which was [commissioned](#) by the Bertelsmann Foundation. The table presented below shows part of the projected effects found by these two studies for corresponding scenarios. Dr. Myant perceived these two papers as popularized and technical versions of the same research, while Dr. Heid insisted the two papers are based on different models.

Projected Increase in Jobs from TTIP		
	Bertelsmann/IFO	IFO Institute
USA	1,085,501	68,790
Germany	181,092	25,220

Benedikt Heid, who was one of the authors of the IFO study that was commissioned by Bertelsmann, defended the numbers as being "in the same ball park" and further admitted that "both the EU and the US can expect some positive employment effects, but these effects are small". However, the response is somewhat unsatisfying in that proponents like Dr. Zeneli on atlantic-community and policy makers like [David Cameron](#) have announced the possibility for huge growth with reference to the finding that TTIP could create two million new jobs, which the Bertelsmann commissioned paper reports for OECD countries, while neglecting to mention the other IFO findings.

The fact that these numbers were used in public by officials backfired immediately: already, [there are groups](#) critical of TTIP highlighting what they perceive as a deliberate attempt of misleading the public. More importantly, this ambiguity might then be interpreted as proof of the insincerity of public officials, with mistrust spilling over in all other areas of discussion surrounding TTIP.

4. Clarify Food Safety Regulation

- **This aspect of the debate suffers more than any other from the effects of a lack of information.**
- **Critics have shown that they do not trust official promises, therefore negotiations should prioritize chapters relevant to this debate and release the agreed upon text as soon as possible.**
- **Proponents and negotiators need to be more active in making clear how the EU and US can cooperate not just on current regulations, but also in adapting to future problems.**

4.1 Assurances are Insufficient to Calm Fears about Food Safety

As with all areas of TTIP, the debate about how an agreement would affect food and environmental regulations relies on insufficient information and each critic or proponent's own expectations. This is of course an inherent problem of the debate at an early stage, since negotiations are still ongoing.

Decision makers and negotiators have stated that the concerns about potential erosion of food safety and environmental regulations are misplaced, as they are specifically excluded from the mandate and thus not on the table. But critics are worried nonetheless. Thus, it is evident that fears and concerns will not be quieted by current assurances but require concrete information and evidence how standards are maintained in practice.

These concerns even extend further than the nature of the agreement, and touch on how the agreement would actually be implemented. [Sabine Ohm](#) of PROVIEH, an organization that fights for better treatment of farm animals, expressed the concern that, even if the agreement does not allow for the sale of products like hormone treated beef, EU consumers would be subject to a significant risk of fraud based on the fact that there are no adequate control mechanisms for US farms or imported produce in place. She argues that the credibility of EU officials' affirmations that EU food standards are not up for negotiation in TTIP is undermined by US government officials demanding accelerated GMO admission procedures and calling for an end to the ban of chlorine-washed chicken and beef from cattle raised with growth hormones, alleging a lack of scientific evidence that these are harmful to human health - the only reason accepted by the US as a trade concern.

Due to the suspicion and sensitivity of these regulations, negotiators should prioritize work on relevant chapters and release concrete information like the text of a preliminary agreement as soon as possible. Doing so would allow for a more informative and productive debate, as well as calming concerns that an agreement will be reached and ratified without sufficient public review.

4.2 Cooperating in the Future

These concerns are not just limited to present regulation. For TTIP to be effective there must be commitment to future cooperation, not just a harmonization of current regulatory schemes. Part of the reason why the arguments against TTIP in this subject are so compelling is that the public does believe that there is a fundamental philosophical difference between the EU and the US regulatory regimes. If neither the EU's "precautionary principle" nor the US' reliance on what proponents refer to as a "scientific approach" is in danger of being changed, then what can future regulation possibly look like? The two arguments presented in the third week that respond to this concern were made by Dr. Elvire Fabry, with Notre Europe, and Lawrence Kogan of the Institute for Trade, Standards, and Sustainable Development, who writes with Lucas Bergkamp of the law firm Hunton & Williams.

[Dr. Fabry](#) brought into question the idea that the US is a less cautious regulator. As evidence she pointed to research indicating that, in the aggregate, regulation in the US applies the precautionary principle on a similar basis as regulation in the EU. However, the research also stated that some areas, like food safety and environmental regulation, do reflect the common understanding that the EU is more cautious.




Photo: US Dept. of Agriculture (CC BY 2.0)

Concluding General Remarks About the TTIP Debate in Germany

During this project we have had the opportunity not just to host debate, but also to follow it in the other places where it is happening. As we have mentioned throughout our conclusions, there is a lack of specific information, which means that many arguments rely heavily on expectations, prejudice, assumptions and mistrust. This is not just harmful to the debate about TTIP, but also to the coherence of the transatlantic community. And the potential harm that can be done by an unhealthy debate increases during a time of little trust between the US and EU as well as between individual EU countries and towards the EU institution.

TTIP presents an opportunity to reinvigorate the transatlantic community both as a strategic community and, to a lesser degree, economically. But a poorly thought out treaty also carries the possibility to accomplish the opposite. And a debate that is plagued by mistrust also has the potential to worse relations within the transatlantic community. There is also a sense of urgency that arises when the public has the impression that there might not be sufficient time to review the results of negotiations before ratification. Therefore, negotiators have a responsibility not to let bad arguments linger by failing to provide information, and to adapt their goals to the concerns that the public has.

Debaters also need to use the available information responsibly. There has been an unfortunate tendency to present extreme cases without acknowledging how extreme they are, as well as a tendency to fill information gaps with one's own prejudice. For instance, the myth that European standards are always more stringent than US standards often plays a role.

This also has particular implications for different countries where the debate is taking place. In Germany, there is a high level of suspicion about ISDS, which is often presented as a new extra-legal tool that is being forced on the country by large US corporate powers. In fact, Germany is already involved in 139 bilateral investment treaties, many of which include ISDS. Given the importance of Germany's commitment to the transatlantic community it is especially crucial that the debate about ISDS be made more about facts and reason than about fear and mistrust.

It is also vital that proponents' presentation of potential benefits is true to the facts, rather than excessively catering to the audience. Again taking the example of Germany, it is conceivable that the economic benefits were sold as the primary reason because most citizens care more about direct monetary benefits than indirect geopolitical gains: increasing mutual investment in the transatlantic community and global standard setting. This may have created interest, but on learning of the truly modest nature of benefits that an agreement would bring economically, skepticism is created about the other benefits as well. TTIP is often seen as a backdoor for the implementation of a neoliberal agenda, benefitting primarily big business.

It is difficult to make policy recommendations for a treaty that is still under negotiation. However, it is not just for practical reasons that our conclusions focus so heavily on the nature of the debate, and on how to create a more productive, lower intensity, less mistrustful one. This report has made several recommendations about how the level of debate can be raised, which would benefit the transatlantic community in addition to increasing public support.

This project was made possible with the generous support of the United States Embassy in Berlin. Atlantic-community.org maintains editorial independence, the conclusions drawn here do not necessarily reflect those of the embassy.



Embassy of the United States

Appendix

This project consisted of three theme weeks in which we brought together opinions from experts at many respected institutions. While the conclusions drawn here are largely based on the evidence and argumentation that was provided in the op-eds, they do not necessarily represent the individual views of all authors on all issues. We recommend that you read the articles from the theme weeks, as they presented many more interesting viewpoints.

TTIP Criticisms: Based on Myths or Reality?

Barbara Unmüßig (Heinrich Böll Foundation) and Bärbel Höhn (Greens in the Bundestag): "CETA and TTIP: Bringing People's Interests Back into Focus" [Link](#)

Michael Hilbert and Christian Eichardt (Initiative of Young Transatlanticists): "Myths and Assumptions about TTIP: A Rebuttal" [Link](#)

Jürgen Knirsch (Greenpeace Germany): "Fundamentally Rethinking TTIP's Priorities" [Link](#)

Sean Flynn (American University College of Law): "A Lesson from ACTA: Pro-Free Traders Need to be Pro-Transparency" [Link](#)

Dr. Holger Janusch (Center for Transformative Research and Sustainability): "Evaluating the Costs Imposed by Open Negotiations" [Link](#)

Matthew Myers (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids): "Stubbing Out the Tobacco Industry's Abuse of Trade Agreements" [Link](#)

Alex Walford (EU Commission): "ISDS: Not a Problem in the Past, Not a Problem in the Future" [Link](#)

Oliver Wieck (International Chamber of Commerce Germany): "New Criticism of ISDS Obscures its Actual History" [Link](#)

Markus Henn (Weltwirtschaft Ökologie und Entwicklung e. V.): "Nothing Learned from the Crisis: Financial Services in TTIP" [Link](#)

Bill Krist (Wilson Center): "Investor-State Dispute Settlement - Can We Get It Right in TTIP?" [Link](#)

Hendrike Kuehl (Trans-Atlantic Business Council): "ISDS Provides Necessary Protection, not a New Avenue to Corporate Profit" [Link](#)

TTIP and the Economy, are the Projected Gains Realistic?

Dr. Kent Hughes (Wilson Center): "Regulatory Cooperation will Provide a Geopolitical Advantage" [Link](#)

Fabian Bohnenberger (Global Public Policy Institute) "TTIP: Reward Worth the Risk?" [Link](#)

Dr. Valbona Zeneli (George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies) "It's About Investments, Not Just Trade" [Link](#)

Dr. Martin Myant (European Trade Union Institute): "TTIP: Exaggerated Benefits and Shaky Estimations" [Link](#)

Dr. Benedikt Heid (University of Bayreuth): "Rebuttal: Criticism of TTIP's Economic Projections" [Link](#)

What Does TTIP Mean for Food and Environment

Dr. Claudia Schmucker (German Council of Foreign Relations): "Why Regulatory Harmonization Will not Equal Regulatory Erosion" [Link](#)

Sabine Ohm (PROVIEH e.V.): "TTIP and CETA Jeopardize EU Agriculture and Environmental, Animal Welfare and Consumer Protection Standards" [Link](#)

Dr. Elvire Fabry (Notre Europe): "Is the European Union More Precautionary than the US?" [Link](#)

Debbie Barker (Center for Food Safety): "Trade Agreements Should Allow Countries to Set High Standards" [Link](#)

Lawrence Kogan, (Institute for Trade, Standards, and Sustainable Development) and Lucas Bergkamp, (Hunton & Williams): "Unbiased Safety Through Procedural Safeguards in TTIP" [Link](#)